If we consult the Oxford English Dictionary, we will see that it defines the term “excellence” as follows: “The state or fact of excelling; the possession chiefly of good qualities in an eminent or unusual degree; surpassing merit, skill, virtue, worth, etc.; dignity, eminence”. In view of this, how political excellence can be defined? It could be defined as a political system which exhibits these qualities; but –continuing with this reasoning–, when could it be said that a political system does it? For me, as it was for the classical writers, the answer is: when it follows the maxim salus populi suprema lex –nothing new under the sun, as can be seen–; in other words, when it fulfils the real interests and needs of the citizens instead of those of the politicians and their parties, or those of the multinationals or other lobbies, etc.

But, how to determine the real interests and needs of the citizens? I am convinced that it is the citizens themselves who have to determine them; nobody better than the people to know what suits them. Certainly, if the citizens leave this job in other hands, even if they leave it completely in the hands of their representatives, nobody would guarantee them that these others will not defend –or, at least, will not be tempted to or will not be pressurized to defend– the interests of themselves or their parties or those of the multinationals and other lobbies instead of those of the community. To be sure, as Quentin Skinner points out, “unless politicians are persons of exceptional altruism, they will always face the temptation of making decisions in line with their own interests and those of powerful pressure-groups, instead of in the interest of the community at large” (Skinner 1992: 47).
That is why Rousseau strongly rejected the representative democracy, since for him a representative means the interference of a particular interest in the general realm, a private interest which, given its position of power, would finally prevail (1).

This does not mean –it cannot–, however that I support a direct and assemblearian democracy à la Athenian, which is not possible nowadays; but I do support popular participation in the widest possible way according to the present circumstances and possibilities –which, as a result of the new technologies, are greater and greater–. What we are dealing with is amplifying the minimum role that western democracies leave for the exercise of citizenship, to the point that “after all, liberal democracy does not consist in the government of the people, but in the government of some persons authorized by them: the politicians” (Rivero 1997: 211). So, political participation is reduced to just a procedure of appointment of the authorities who are to rule the community in a very discretional way, as they are not subject to the opinions of the electors, except for the fact that, if they do not want to be replaced by others, they will have to take care of the citizens´ demands to a certain extent. This leads the individuals to realise that they count for less and less, that politics has become “their business”, the monopoly of a political class which too often is unable to represent nor defend the will and the interests of the citizens; all this, besides the damage itself, also drives the citizens to the apathy and the disbelief and even the rejection of the politics and the politicians, which makes them easy prey of totalitarian ideologies and religious and nationalistic integrisms (Flores D´Arcais 2001: 108).
That is why I completely agree with the contemporary proponents of the old philosophical-political tradition of the civic republicanism in that it is necessary and urgent that the government promote a political participation both extensive –that is, which involves as many citizens as possible– and intensive –that is, which goes beyond the simple vote, as citizens should not be considered as mere electors, but as persons who take part continuously and responsibly in the decisions concerning the life of their community. Besides avoiding the mentioned threats, republicans think that such a participation would bring other advantages.

In the first place, there is an intrinsic relation between participation and freedom. Certainly, according to Iseult Honohan (2002: 187), individual autonomy depends to a great extent on the social context, since it is undeniable that political decisions concern the range of possibilities open to individuals; that is why if these lack the actual chance to participate in the implementation of these decisions, their autonomy will unavoidably lessen. Secondly, an intense participation will yield better and juster laws and decisions and, as a result, a better and juster society. And this, because, as stated by Paul Brest (1988: 1624), real participation and deliberation compels us to listen to the positions of other people and, thus, makes us aware of our more remote and indirect connections with them and, therefore, of the consequences that our decisions and actions will have for our fellow citizens as well as of their effect on the community as a whole in the long term. And, finally, a widespread political participation will compel the government to take care of our necessities and interests; indeed, if we want to construct a genuine democracy, one in which government is for the people as a result of being by the people, it is essential that their work is watched over by the social power citizens exert on their representatives, not only through the elections, but also by means of other ways of political participation and expression (such as popular assemblies, referenda, consultations, and so on). In short, we can affirm, with Salvador Giner, that “we the citizens must do everyday policies; the government is not the only responsible: if they make mistakes and persist is because we allow it to them” (Giner 2000: 172) (2).

Two requirements must be fulfilled in order to make possible this widespread, responsible and conscious participation: 1) to count on “well-ordered institutions” (in words of Machiavelli), designed to allow and to encourage such a participation as well as to promote the common good: 2) to count on conscious, responsible, public-spirited citizens, prepared to get involved in politics and to do so in a responsible and conscious way.
With regard to the first requirement, some proposals can be effected. Firstly, today, as a consequence of the development of communication and information technologies, citizens are more and more informed and interconnected so that they can organize themselves better and faster in order to press the governments, the international organizations or the multinational companies. And even, in a very near future, this technology could be used in order to make popular consultations much more agile (why not to vote, comfortably, from home, via internet?).
Another way of increasing the opportunities for self-government would be a larger decentralization of the political power, granting to cities and towns the capacity to make important decisions which concern them, and making possible that each citizen can take part in the decision-making process, so that everybody can say and do anything. It would also be extremely important to encourage citizens to get more involved in NGOs and other types of associations: workers, cultural, religious, environmental, sport, neibourhood, etc. which should be given real powers and capacity of decision. This “politics on a small scale” would constitute the base –as stated by Honohan (2002:239)– for the citizens to get involved in the management of public affairs in areas and issues more familiar to them, and where their interests are more immediate and clear, which, in turn, would help them to overcome their feeling of impotence and would assist them to develop a sense of responsibility. However, we should be very demanding with the transparency of these organisations and, especially, we should demand a rigorously democratic management of them –including the political parties– so that they become truly representative of the civil society, given that otherwise we would run the risk of turning the present partitocracies into oligarchies in the hands of the leaders of these NGOs and other associations.

On the other hand, the representative bodies –typically, the parliaments– should become more representative. That is, all the diverse sensibilities, perspectives, interests and opinions should be represented in them; especially, it should be assured in all the decision-making areas a representation of the minorities and groups which usually have been under-represented or, simply, absent, such as women, ethnical or cultural minorities, the disabled and so on  (3). This should be complemented with what Philip Pettit calls “contestability” (Pettit 1999): each of these groups should have the capacity of contesting any decision taken by these representative institutions if they consider it to be seriously harmful to their interests (even if it is favourable to the interests of the majority). These measurements would make the decisions taken by these institutions not only more participative and democratic, but also fairer and more beneficial for the whole community since they could not be made by any single group however important or majority it was. Another proposal on a similar line comes from Cass Sunstein, who proposes that one of the functions of the judicial review should be, precisely, the invalidation of those laws that have been approved without any adequate previous process of deliberation, and which, because of that, only benefits some sectors of society.  

However, there is no point in having institutions designed to favour an ample, intense and responsible participation if there are not citizens equipped with which traditionally has been called "civic virtue", that is, citizens well formed and informed, committed, who do not let themselves deceive, and who are prepared to participate responsibly and to resign to their egoistic interests in favour of the common good. Of course, it is necessary to be conscious that civic virtue is a rare good, but this does not imply that it cannot be increased if the appropriate conjuncture is created. Also, as stated by Giner (2000: 153), it is necessary to remind that civic virtue has modest pretensions: it does not demand sanctity, it requests only obedience to legitimate laws, a certain interest for national and international politics, not to let oneself be guided nor indoctrinated and, mainly, a certain capacity of active participation in the public realm, however hard that this can be sometimes. On the other hand, it is undeniable that individuals fulfil on a daily basis their obligations towards others, fulfil their obligations as parents, neighbours, friends and professionals; therefore, why should they not be able to fulfil their obligations as citizens towards their community? (4).

Many are the ways which civic republicanism has proposed to make men public spirited. Firstly, the government should afford the resources required for such an aim. Some of them are resources of economic and social sort; concretely, a great importance must be given to the social rights, which guarantee a certain equality, security and welfare, as we can take for granted that economic independence provides political independence, and that those who are better off participate more and, for that reason, they exert a greater influence in the public powers, among other reasons, because those who are worried about their subsistence, hardly will be able to worry about politics. But, of course, an extreme material equality is not necessary, it is sufficient just to take a number of political, social and economical measures to promote the independence of citizens; that is, the goal is to provide the individuals with a certain level of welfare which let them enjoy the time, the resources, the culture, the education and the knowledge necessary to exercise their civic duties (5).

Notwithstanding, this is not enough, as people need also to be motivated to fulfil their civic duties, and for such an aim the central instrument on which society can rely is education. The republican conception of the civic education can be defined, according to the report displayed to the French minister of research in 1998, as “the body of knowledge and the practices destined to provide each citizen, member of the political body –and, therefore, of the “sovereign”– with the enlightment, the knowledge and the values that will allow them to exert their prerogatives fully and to fulfil the duties derived from them”. It is necessary, thus, to teach the people both to defend their legitimate interests and to perform their duties, to obey the law and to respect the institutions, but also to criticize and to correct them if necessary. Nothing less, but nothing more because, as it is recognized in the mentioned report, if the education goes further on, it would take the risk of falling in the totalitarian indoctrination: the Republic has the obligation, not to impose a content to the election of the citizens, but to remember them, and even inculcate, the bases of civic and political morals.

Education will also be useful to inculcate the citizens, from childhood, the civic virtue par excellence, the patriotism, since if they love their fatherland sincerely they will be prepared to serve it faithfully, to obey its laws and to sacrifice by it. However, Maurizio Viroli (1997: 81) observes that the republican patriotism must not be seen as the love of an abstract and impersonal entity, but as an attachment to concrete people, to fellow citizens with whom we live and with whom we share common interests and laws, as well as a gratitude feeling towards our Republic, because this guarantees our freedom and our welfare. However, if citizens feel that their efforts and sacrifices are not rewarded, no matter how much they are inculcated since the childhood the patriotism, the responsible citizenship and the civic commitment because these feelings will be ephemeral; that is, only if citizens find in the laws and the institutions an expression of themselves, if they see that their true interests are satisfied, that welfare policies reach to all, that the Administration is effective, etc., they will identify with their community and will be prepared to assume their responsibilities willingly. In short, we can state that “citizens respect their republic if this corresponds them” (Giner 2000: 160).
On the other hand, increasing the citizens´ opportunities for the participation and for taking real decisions will itself increase their political commitment because people only take participation seriously when the issues under discussion affect their interests directly and when they have a real opportunity to be heard and to influence in the political activity. Certainly, the apathy of the citizens is, to a great extent, an answer to the present political conditions, because they feel that their options of election between political parties and programs of government truly differentiated as well as their opportunities to participate are very limited. Nevertheless, the fact that, in spite of this, a significant number of citizens still goes to vote suggests that political participation is a something very appreciated by them; in addition, the increasing number of alternative forms of public activity suggests that a good amount of political energy is canalized towards communal or environmental vindications or movements of protest, through which citizens try to defend their interests and rights as well as the common good (Honohan 2002: 218).

In short, as accurately stated by Ovejero, “if I can make my voice be heard then I have a reason to speak; if I feel that I am listened when I speak, I have a reason to continue participating; nevertheless, when individuals think that it does not matter whether they participate or not, when the unquestionable cost of the political commitment is compared with its irrelevance, participation evidently is discouraged” (Ovejero 2001: 29). On the contrary, when one perceives that between his election and what it can get to happen there is a non-remote, causal relation, one begins to think about what to do and to take seriously the importance of their participation for the success or the failure of the common projects. And, indeed, all the republican writers have emphasized repeatedly the fact that those citizens who participate in the communal self-government, attend the debates, express their opinions in the public councils, choose representatives and supervise their work, such citizens feel the public good as their own and develop towards it an adhesion similar to which they feel towards their own property (Viroli 1997: 101).

Notes

(1) Something which, in his view, happened too often in all the representative systems, included the British one, to which he dedicated this famous critic: “the English think they are free, but they are completely mistaken; they are free only during the election of the members of the parliament; as soon as these have been chosen, the English are slaves again, they are nothing”; which makes him conclude that “at the brief moments of their freedom, they deserve to lose it for the bad use they do of it” (Rousseau 1964: 430).

(2) Another important virtue of a widespread political participation that has been recurrently indicated by the republican authors is that where all participate in the elaboration of the laws, it is more likely that they are observed, since when people feel themselves as co-authors of a law which has not be imposed by some else, they accept and respect it much more easily. In that regard, Marsilius of Padua wrote that “what concerns to the convenience or inconvenience of everybody must be heard and known by everybody so that they all can accept the advisable things and reject the opposite things”;  however, if the law is given by one or a few, “the rest of the citizens would hardly stand such a law, no matter how good it is and would protest about it and in no case would observe it”; but a law given with the hearing and the consensus of all the multitude will easily be accepted by any citizen because it is “as if everyone had given it to themselves” (Marsilius of Papua 1989: 54). 

(3) Infact it can be said that the reason why most of the parliamentary assemblies in the world are chosen on the basis of territorial circumscriptions is to obtain a suitable representation of the different groups, since each one has its own characteristics, problems and interests. It is not, therefore, preposterous to affirm that the racial or ethnic groups (among others) are the contemporaries equivalent of the groups that traditionally have been defined in geographic terms (Sunstein 1988).

(4) It should not be seen as a chimera, either, that citizens resign to some of their particular interests in favour of the common good. It is possible if they are clearly explained that there are some common goods which benefit to all of us, such as peace or a healthful environment, that cannot be promoted effectively by the citizens individually, not even by the political institutions alone, but the joint effort of all the community is needed for their attainment. Common good, thus, must not be seen as the good of an something or someone different and superior to the citizens, but as the good of the citizens themselves as members of a political community, which sometimes can differ from their immediate good as singular individuals; so, those who give priority to their private interests are, really, narrow-minded and incapable to notice what actually suits them; however, giving priority to the common good implies to persecute long term interests or to be more perceptive in defending their real interests. We are facing, therefore, an instrumental conception of the civic virtue, since as Oldfield points out, citizenship does not have anything to do with altruism, but with the recognition of the goals of the society as own (Oldfield 1990).    

(5) Some republicans have proposed other measures to limit the effects of the money in the political process. For instance, Sunstein considers essential to regulate intensely the electoral campaigns in order to counteract the distortions caused by the very unequal budgets at the disposal of the different competing groups and parties. It has also been often proposed, in order to achieve a real equality among the different political alternatives, to help them access to the mass media, both public and private, in conditions of equality (Sunstein 1988).

References:
 
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Flores D´Arcais, P. (2001). El individuo libertario. Barcelona: Seix Barral

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Marsilius of Padua (1989). El defensor de la paz. Madrid: Tecnos

Oldfield, A. (1990). Citizenship and community: Civic Republicanism and the modern world, London: Routledge

Ovejero, F. (2001). “Democracia liberal y democracias republicanas”, in Claves de razón práctica, nº 111.

Pettit, P. (1999). Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Governmen. Oxford University Press

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Viroli, M. (1997). For love of the country: an essay on patriotism and nationalism. Oxford: Clarendon